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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how Sweden and Finland have changed their security 
policies in the Baltic region after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation 
and analyzes what this policy means for the United States and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Although Sweden and Finland are not full members of NATO, 
since 1994, when they became Partners for Peace in cooperation with NATO, Sweden 
and Finland have drawn closer to the alliance and, since 2014, have engaged in a 
posture that is far closer to a collective defense. The two neutral Nordics have increased 
cooperation with the organization and other member countries that border the Baltic 
Sea. They have become surrogate NATO allies, but they are not de jure engaged under 
Article V of the Washington treaty.
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines how Sweden and Finland have changed their security policies 
in the Baltic region after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and what this 
policy means for the U.S. and NATO. Although Sweden and Finland are not full members 
of NATO, since 1994 they have drawn closer to the alliance in a variety of ways, but 
especially since 2014 have engaged in a posture which is far closer to collective defense 
than heretofore. The two neutral Nordics have increased cooperation with the organization 
and other member countries that border the Baltic Sea. Sweden and Finland became 
Partners for Peace (PfP) in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in 1994. They have become surrogate NATO allies, but are not de jure engaged 
under Article V of the Washington treaty.1 
Sweden and Finland have bilateral agreements with one another as well as with the 
United States in cooperation between each country’s respective Defense Departments and 
Ministries. What I have discovered through this research is the significant strategic changes 
in Baltic defense polices, and how it has increased since the annexation of Crimea and what 
these changes mean for a U.S. Navy officer who might serve in the Baltic.  
The changes in the defense policies of Sweden and Finland may well show the 
deterrent capabilities that they possess by remaining out of either NATO or Russia’s 
military alliances. Are Sweden and Finland able to remain neutral because of their 
willingness to negotiate with both sides? Does cooperation between Sweden and Finland 
create some other deterrent towards Russia, while also keeping Russia in a strategic limbo 
as to whether Finland and Sweden will join NATO? Although Finland and Sweden are 
increasing cooperation efforts with one another and with NATO, these two countries make 
policy decisions differently. Due to both countries’ geography, their distances from Russia 
play a role in decision making. Both countries remain neutral, but cooperate enough to 
maintain their sovereignty, yet also are able to deter Russia. Because Sweden and Finland 
                                                 
1 “Partners,” NATO, September 25, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm. 
2 
are non-aligned states that have closer values with NATO and not Russia these two 
countries must consider their polices appropriately in order not to upset the security balance 
in the Baltic. Finland may have closer aligning polices at times with Russia due to its shared 
border and Sweden may implement stronger polices to push back Russian attempts to 
encroach on its sovereignty. Finland and Sweden are both non-aligned countries, but each 
has to weigh its policy decisions carefully and in different manners. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Sweden and Finland's positions in the Baltic Sea play a strategic role in the freedom 
of navigation for military and economic resources in and out of the Baltic. The significance 
of these questions has become particularly relevant after the annexation of Crimea. As 
Russia continues to grow its military and economic power, it will require a wider range of 
influence not only through the southern Black Sea region but also in those waters to the 
west and in the Arctic region, which have always been the geopolitical maritime paths to 
world power. The proximity of Finland to Russia is a growing strategic concern when 
looking at which countries will have the greatest influence over the Baltic Sea. Sweden 
also plays a role in the maritime control of the Baltic Sea and maintains close ties with 
Finland for cooperative efforts in both countries’ defense policies.2  
The continued efforts to maintain defense ties among nations have been shown 
through multinational operations at sea and ashore between Swedish and U.S. military 
forces, while also including other militaries of the Baltic.3 Sweden and Finland are not 
members of NATO, which means there is no Article V agreement to come to either 
country’s aid in case of attack. Similar to what happened in Ukraine, Sweden and Finland 
could be next for Russia, even though they are not former Soviet states as Ukraine and the 
Baltic state are. Although Sweden and Finland are not full members of NATO, they still 
cooperate with NATO as PfP and have continued to show interest in cooperating with 
                                                 
2 Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden (Sweden and 
Finland: Finish Defence Forces and the Swedish Armed Forces, 2015), 
https://www.government.se/government-policy/defence/defence-cooperation-between-finland-and-
sweden/. 
3 Swedish Armed Forces, “Aurora 17,” Försvarsmakten, accessed August 22, 2019, 
https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/aurora-17/. 
3 
western nations. There have been additional bilateral agreements among Finland and 
Sweden and the United States on maintaining good relations, enhancing security 
cooperation in the region.  
The policies Sweden and Finland enact will have a direct effect on the other 
countries located in the Baltic region, and since many of these countries are members of 
NATO, these policies will have interacting connections between each party’s defense 
organizations. Norway will play a part in the NATO strategy regarding the Baltic due to 
its geographical location at the entrance between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Norway 
and Sweden will most likely play a maritime role in the strategy that will be required in the 
Baltic. Finland, along with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, will make up most of the land 
forces since they directly border Russia.  
Russia is uncomfortable about losing its former buffer states and may make 
aggressive actions towards Sweden and Finland for enhancing cooperation with NATO 
and other Western alliances. 4 Russia has also had concerns with NATO expansion as the 
former Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have become members of NATO.5 
Finland is in an interesting position as it is located next to the Kola Peninsula, which is of 
strategic importance to Russia as a large number of its nuclear ballistic submarines 
(SSBNs), part of the nuclear triad, are stationed out of the Kola Peninsula.6 A buildup of 
NATO forces in Finland could be perceived as a threat to Russia's secured second-strike 
capability by potential land invasion on its Northern border.  
Finnish and Swedish policies, cooperation, and their willingness to invest in 
bilateral and alliance agreements will impact future interactions between countries and 
alliances in the Baltic Sea region. The Scandinavian defense strategy enacted by the 
                                                 
4 Sam Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering Anti-Access and Area-Denial Strategies (Annapolis, 
UNITED STATES: Naval Institute Press, 2013), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=1381905. 
5 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004. “Member Countries,” NATO, accessed 
December 11, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm. 
6 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy: 
Unified Effort 2015” (Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, 2015), 21, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/fd/dokumenter/unified-effort.pdf. 
4 
different defense ministers and departments provides a significant area to study. Depending 
on how Russia perceives these policies, its defense ministry may be provoked into issuing 
a response. What that response will be, whether policy-based that becomes active or 
passive, is not entirely certain, but through further research, an informed estimate may be 
possible.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defense policy, economy, and strategy for the Baltic Sea countries forms the core 
of the content.7 I plan to focus on the interactions among Sweden, Finland, the United 
States within and outside of NATO through bilateral agreements, and the NATO country 
of Norway.8 Much of the language and proposed intent of the documents and articles 
reviewed indicate increased cooperation among western states and organizations. Not all 
discussions between states have led to solid defense treaties or military alliances. In a time 
of crisis, neighboring countries would likely come to another’s aid.9 
                                                 
7 Such policies include: Ministry of Defence, “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020” (Ministry of 
Defence, June 2, 2015), 
https://www.government.se/49c007/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_def
ence_policy_2016_to_2020; Prime Minister’s Office, “Government’s Defence Report (Statsrådets 
Försvarpolitiska Redogörelse),” Prime Minister’s Office Publications (Lönnberg Print & Promo, February 
16, 2017), 
https://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf. 
8 “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on Defence Cooperation,” July 9, 2018, 
https://www.government.se/49fcef/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/2018/mou-
finnish-swedish-defence-cooperation-20180625-signerad.pdf.; Department of Defense of the united States 
of America and Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland, “Statement of Intent between the 
Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Finland,” October 7, 2016, https://www.defmin.fi/files/3543/Statement_of_Intent.pdf; Department of 
Defense United States, Ministry of Defence Republic of Finland, and Ministry of Defence Kingdom of 
Sweden, Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America 
and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of 
Sweden (Washignton, D.C., 2018), https://www.government.se/press-releases/2018/05/minister-of-defence-
peter-hultqvist-signs-trilateral-statement-of-intent/; Dana White, “Secretary Mattis Hosts Finnish, Swedish, 
Ministers for Trilateral Meet,” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, May 8, 2018, 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1515657/secretary-mattis-hosts-finnish-
swedish-ministers-for-trilateral-meeting/.  
9 Through further cooperation in the military and political realms Sweden, Finland, the United States, 
and other countries in the Baltic have continued dialogue that favors policies of supporting one another in 
times of crisis. Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Christofer Berglund, “Bursting the Bubble? Russian 
A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications” (Stockholm, Sweden: 




Sweden is located in the central geopolitical location in the Baltic Sea between 
Finland and Norway. Southern Sweden is across the Baltic Sea from the Russian exclave 
of Kaliningrad, which may become an increased security concern for Sweden. Sweden has 
mainly kept a policy of neutrality for most of its modern history but has begun to realize, 
due to its central location, the importance of the role it may play in future security issues.10 
The Swedish government was not as concerned with defense spending and the buildup of 
its military forces prior to 2014 due to its policies of neutrality and the unlikelihood of a 
potential attack on Sweden.11 Many of the cuts took place at the end of the Cold War, as 
they did with many other countries throughout Europe. From 1990-2015, military 
personnel dropped from a wartime strength of 800,000 to around 50,000.12 With the 
potential for Russia to increase its focus in the Baltic, Sweden has begun additional military 
spending and continues to focus on the buildup of its defense as seen in the 2016-2020 
Swedish Defence Bill.13 Additional military spending will focus on building up Sweden’s 
defense capabilities through training exercises and better equipment to help the country 
improve its readiness.14 Sweden has addressed its security shortfalls and has begun 
implementing changes to try to move its defense strategy in an appropriate direction to 
address Russian security issues.  
Sweden has taken steps prior to the events of 2014 to deepen its cooperative efforts 
with NATO and other allied countries by its participation in operations in Afghanistan 
                                                 
10 Eva Frisell and Emma Sjökvist, “Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European 
Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities,” FOI-R—4672—SE (Stockholm, Sweden: 
Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2019), 12, https://www.foi.se/report-
summary?reportNo=FOI-R--4672--SE; Juha Pyykönen and Stefan Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic 
Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together With the U.S. Army – SSI (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
United States Army War College Press, 2019), 35, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/deterrence-in-the-nordic-
baltic-region-the-role-of-the-nordic-countries-together-with-the-u-s-army/. 
11 Frisell and Sjökvist, “Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the 
Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities,” 12. 
12 Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 36. 
13 Ministry of Defence, “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020.” 
14 Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 37. 
6 
since 2001.15 The current mission in Afghanistan is known as NATO’s Resolute Support 
Mission (RSM), but prior to the turnover of security responsibilities to the Afghan 
government the mission was under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).16 
Sweden has supported the mission in Afghanistan by providing security forces in advisor 
roles, medical staff, air cargo loadout personnel, and a support unit to assist in security 
operations.17 Sweden has helped in the NATO lead mission of ISAF which primary 
objective was to prevent the reemergence of terrorist actives in the country of 
Afghanistan.18 Sweden is still supporting RSM by providing 29 personnel that provide 
support in an advisory capacity to Afghan security forces.19 Sweden has advanced its 
cooperative efforts for supporting security in different regions of the world which provides 
valuable experience for implementing its own security policies at home. 
Sweden has begun implementing what it believes internally will be a sufficient 
security policy to counteract Russian advances into the Baltic, but there is a dynamic of 
cooperation between nations and alliances that should also be considered. Shortly after the 
annexation of Crimea, Finland and Sweden agreed to a joint action plan in April 2014.20 
Since 2014, Sweden and Finland’s militaries have increased cooperation through different 
levels of involvement and participation in both nations’ exercises, including Finland’s 
                                                 
15 “Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission),” Swedish Armed Forces, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/current-international-missions/afghanistan-resolute-support-
mission/. 
16 Swedish Armed Forces. 
17 Swedish Armed Forces. 
18 “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived),” NATO, accessed December 27, 2019, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm. 
19 “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
June 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_2019-06-RSM-
Placemat.pdf. 
20 Stefan Lundqvist and J. J. Widen, “Swedish–Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea: Motives, 
Prospects and Challenges,” Defence Studies 16, no. 4 (October 1, 2016): 360, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1220805; Oxford Analytica, “FINLAND/SWEDEN: Military Ties 
Are Set to Deepen,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, August 3, 2018, 2, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2082111155?accountid=12702. 
7 
Ruska military exercise and Sweden’s exercise Aurora.21 Since 2014, both countries have 
worked to create Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group to conduct maritime surveillance and 
protection operations in the Baltic Sea.22 Continuing cooperation between these two 
countries will help send a message of deterrence to Russia. 
2. FINLAND 
Finland has to consider many external issues when determining its security policy 
because of its geopolitical location. Since Finland is located next to Russia and shares 
approximately an 800-mile border, Finland’s main focus would be on its land forces vice 
its naval forces.23 Finland’s geographical location next to Russia gives a good picture as to 
why there are concerns with having a strong land force in the event of a land grab by 
Russia.24 The Gulf of Finland matters as this body of water is Russia’s access point to the 
Baltic Sea from the large naval port in St. Petersburg, so Finland also has to be cognizant 
of potential attacks from the sea. 25 Due to Sweden’s larger role in the maritime realm, 
further cooperation should be done with the combined Naval Task Group. Finland also has 
to be concerned with the Kola Peninsula in the north, as this is of strategic importance to 
the Russian Federation.26  
                                                 
21 Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Henri Vanhanen, “Finland’s Defence Cooperation: The ‘No a Priori 
Limits’ Approach with Sweden Should Be a Model for Other Cooperation Efforts,” Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, no. 23 (December 2018): 2, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/comment23_finland_defence_cooperation2.pdf; Oxford Analytica, 
“FINLAND/SWEDEN,” 2. 
22 Mikko Villikori, “Finnish - Swedish Naval Co-Operation Baltic Rim Economies,” Baltic Rim 
Economics 2, no. 2524 (May 2019), https://sites.utu.fi/bre/finnish-swedish-naval-co-operation/. 
23 Kristin Archick, “The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations,” August 26, 2019, 1, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10740. 
24 Finland discusses its land defense strategy for a potential arrack or crisis: “Government’s Defence 
Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska Redogörelse),” 21, 34. 
25 A current example is the Russian Navy Day parade and Ocean Shield 2019 which is a Russian naval 
exercise in the Baltic Sea that incorporates many of the ships from St. Petersburg. Roger McDermott, 
“Russia Rehearses Multi-Platform Warfare in the Baltic Sea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 113 (August 
6, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-rehearses-multi-platform-warfare-in-the-baltic-sea/. 
26 Prime Minister’s Office, “Government’s Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska 
Redogörelse),” 8; Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 25. 
8 
These factors and several others have an impact on Finland’s defense.27 The 32,000 
Russians that live within Finland's borders as of 2018 may create an internal security 
concern.28 Russia may take actions similar to what happened in Ukraine, moving to 
“protect” the interests of Russian nationals in Finland.29 Cyber-attacks and psychological 
operations (PSYOP) impacting Finnish critical infrastructure, institutions, and citizens are 
all potential threats that have been recognized by the Finnish government.30  
Similar to other countries in Europe, Finland has gone through a period of military 
downsizing, but with the current security concerns posed by Russia, the government has 
returned to a buildup. Finnish Defense report shows that it has assessed its defense forces 
as currently at an adequate level, but much of the equipment will be phased out during the 
next decade.31 New equipment is in the process of being procured for each branch of its 
military. With an ever-changing strategic environment, the Finnish government will not 
only need the most up-to-date equipment but will require further cooperation with other 
nations and alliances.  
Until Finland joins NATO it will remain militarily non-aligned.32 There are 
political reasons why Finland has stayed militarily non-aligned since it borders Russia. If 
Finland joins NATO, it would most likely be considered a threat to Russia. Finland and 
Sweden have both been warned by Russian leadership that they should not join NATO 
least actions be taken against them.33  
                                                 
27 Prime Minister’s Office, “Government’s Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska 
Redogörelse),” 10. 
28 Statistics Finland, “Appendix Figure 2. Largest Dual Nationality Groups Permanently Resident in 
Finland by Their Second Nationality in 2018,” September 13, 2019, 
http://www.stat.fi/til/kans/2018/kans_2018_2019-09-13_kuv_002_en.html; Pyykönen and Forss, 
Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 26. 
29 Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 26. 
30 Prime Minister’s Office, “Government’s Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska 
Redogörelse),” 9. 
31 Prime Minister’s Office, 12. 
32 Prime Minister’s Office, 14. 
33 Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 26. 
9 
 Finland and Sweden have increased cooperation through bilateral agreements, but 
cooperation with member countries of NATO should also be taken into consideration. Due 
to the border that Finland and Russia share, it is understandable why the Finnish 
government would take careful consideration before joining any military alliance. Russia’s 
aggressive posture has caused the Finnish Government to state “the use or threat of military 
force against Finland cannot be ruled out and that it will prepare itself for threats 
accordingly.”34 The government understands the neighboring threat but remains cautious 
in terms of alliances. Finland continues to build its bilateral cooperation with notable 
defense partners like Sweden and the United States.35 
Finland has taken part in different military security and crisis operations in 
cooperation with NATO and other allied countries to include Implementation Force 
(IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR), ISAF, and RSM.36 Finland 
has taken part in a variety of operations in cooperation with NATO and continues to do so 
by being part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and contributing 67 personnel to support 
RSM advisory missions in Afghanistan.37 Through further Finnish cooperation with NATO 
as a PfP and by Finland participating in most of the alliances operations its commitment to 
providing security in the region is visible. 
3. NATO 
In this declining security situation, the United States and NATO have given 
reassurance that they are committed to defending their allies, particularly the Baltic States 
and Poland, which face challenges to their security and sovereignty.38 These challenges 
                                                 
34 Pyykönen and Forss, 25. 
35 Pyykönen and Forss, 27. The European Union (EU) was also included as a notable partner of 
Finland, but further research into this area may go beyond the scope of this study. 
36 Ministry of Defence, “Ministry of Defence of Finland - Nato,” accessed February 23, 2020, 
https://www.defmin.fi/en/tasks_and_activities/defence_policy/nato; NATO, “NATO/IFOR Homepage,” 
Operation Joint Endeavour, accessed December 27, 2019, https://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm; NATO, 
“Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” SFOR, accessed May 2, 2020, 
https://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm; NATO, “KFOR,” History, accessed April 23, 2020, 
https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history. 
37 Ministry of Defence, “Ministry of Defence of Finland - Nato”; NATO, “Resolute Support Mission 
(RSM): Key Facts and Figures.” 
38 Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 2. 
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will have to be met by a constructive deterrent, which is outlined by addressing five of 
these challenges in Michael Rühle’s NATO Defense College Policy Brief No.15.39 The five 
challenges are as follows: terminology, over-generalization, the unclear role of military 
means, twisting the image of your opponent, and the de-politicization of the debate.40 These 
five challenges are issues that should be addressed for deterrence to be an effective tool for 
NATO, to use against Russia.  
These five challenges should be broken up into two parts. The first two, 
terminology and over-generalization, play into one another which is why they are discussed 
together. The last three challenges also show connections among them. 
The correct use of the first challenge, terminology, should help lessen the confusion 
that comes from dealing in military operations in a joint environment. The use of correct 
terminology also plays into the second challenge to prevent over-generalization and 
correctly identify the level of force Russia may be using against its target. There are 
differences between cyber and kinetic attacks not only in the realm in which they are 
conducted but also in the severity of the damage that they inflict. For example, a cyber-
attack towards a country’s nuclear energy infrastructure could be more severe than a land 
assault or artillery strike on a military target.  
In the third challenge, the unclear role of military means, just because NATO 
understands the capabilities of Russia does not mean that it understands the Russian 
strategy of where it would strike. By understanding Russian interests a more effective 
deterrent should be possible to implement. The third challenge also plays into the fourth, 
twisting the image of your opponent, because NATO must be under the assumption they 
are dealing with a rational actor for deterrence to be effective.41 If the image of the 
adversary is twisted and no rationale can be determined behind its motives then deterrence 
will fail. The fifth challenge, the de-politicization of the debate, also plays into three and 
                                                 
39 Michael Rühle, “Deterring Hybrid Threats: The Need for a More Rational Debate” (NATO Defense 
College, July 2019), http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1335. 
40 Rühle, “Deterring Hybrid Threats: The Need for a More Rational Debate,” 2–3. 
41 Rühle, 3. It is also important to note that the deterrence model created by NATO is not just a model 
of what NATO would do against itself, but what would be an effective deterrent against Russia. What 
would Russia do to deter itself?  
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four by looking into Russian capabilities and interests to understand what is possible to 
deter and what cannot. A cost-benefit analysis needs to be made on the priorities of both 
parties involved to see what is possible to stop and whether the cost of stopping is actually 
worth the resources necessary. Not all hybrid threats can be deterred and some losses will 
be taken, but if measures are put in place to make acceptable losses more likely in the event 
one happens that could allow for a stronger strategy. 
Since the Warsaw Summit in 2016 the members of NATO have implemented an 
enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic states and Poland.42 The eFP is divide into 
four battle groups that are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United 
States with a combined troop strength of almost 4800 personnel.43 There are 20 different 
countries that are providing forces to strengthen the collective defense deterrent that NATO 
provides its member states.44 Since forces were deployed in 2017 there has been a 
continuous multinational presence in all four countries ready to conduct military operations 
with host nations defense forces.45 If Russia were to attack any of the Baltic states or Poland 
it will likely trigger an Article V discussion among the members of NATO.  
A key issue that challenges NATO is having all of its members being able to 
coordinate and work together as a single unit. This key challenge is a great task for any 
organization to take on, but especially so for an organization that includes the world’s top 
military powers. NATO has four priorities, speed of decision making, command and 
control, force readiness, and enablement.46 The NATO Political-Military Process requires 
consensus among its members before moving on to the next step of a plan which has an 
                                                 
42 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016,” NATO, July 9, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm; “Warsaw Summit Key Decisions” (Warsaw: 
NATO, February 2017), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-
factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf; “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence” (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, July 2019), 
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190627_1906-factsheet_efp_en.pdf. 
43 “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.” 
44 NATO. 
45 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016.” 
46 “Naval FAO Power Point Presentation,” Power Point (NATO EUCOM, n.d.), accessed September 
14, 2019. 
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effect on the speed of decision making, but is an important part of the process to ensure all 
members are aligned with the mission of the alliance.47 NATO is working to streamline 
requirements and permission to have a faster response time. One example is NATO’s goal 
to accelerate border crossing procedure to five days for routine evolutions and faster times 
for crisis situations.48 The enhancement of the cohesive force of NATO will help improve 
decision making and timelines in the event hostilities are taken against ally nations. 
NATO still maintains its requirements to Article V for the collective defense of all 
its members even if some challenges remain with the deterrent aspect of the organization. 
Challenges will always have to be overcome, but through the cooperation of NATO 
members there will most likely be enough capabilities shared between one another to be 
an effective deterrent or a formidable force if needed to take action. 
4. NORWAY 
Norway is in a unique position both geographically and politically concerning its 
Nordic neighbors.49 Norway does not have direct interaction with Russia through the Baltic 
but does have concerns about incidents occurring in the High North that could potentially 
develop in future conflicts.50 Norway has responsibilities to address for its own country as 
well as responsibilities to NATO. Norway believes its main focus is limited to maritime 
operations concerning surveillance and identification of potential adversaries and their 
assets.51 Some of the main priorities that the Norwegian defense plan focuses on are its 
national defense, the collective defense under its agreement with NATO, international 
crisis management, and the concept of total defense.52 Norway plays an active role in its 
                                                 
47 Col. Pete Goldfein, “U.S. Military Delegation to the NATO Military Committee,” Power Point 
(NATO EUCOM, n.d.), Slide 10, accessed September 14, 2019. 
48 NATO, “Naval FAO Power Point Presentation.” 
49 Nordic countries include Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland according to: Archick, 
“The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations,” 1. 
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research.  
51 Pyykönen and Forss, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region, 19. 
52 Pyykönen and Forss, 20. 
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cooperation with NATO through Host Nation Support (HNS) by storing U.S. Military 
equipment and conducting winter warfare training with the Marine Corps since 2017.53 
Norway continues cooperation efforts between its NATO partners, whom it would have to 
rely upon in case of hostilities enacted by Russia. 
An important part of the Norwegian Defense plan is the aspect in which it views 
the world and has an impact on its security. There are a few issues that Norway considers 
in its defense policy: the multipolar world that it lives in, Russia trying to regain its great 
power status, and finally non-conventional threats.54 Norway’s concern for a multipolar 
world is the potential for the United States to stray from its engagement in Europe as the 
political and economic importance of Asia increases. The “deep peace” of Europe has now 
been challenged by Russia after it annexed Crimea and caused tensions to rise in the 
region.55 The other concern is on non-conventional threats related to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), terrorism, and cyber-attacks.56  
Norway has several areas to consider in its national defense policy to ensure it 
protects its borders as well as maintaining its requirements in the collective defense of its 
fellow allies within NATO and its Nordic neighbors. Although Norway is not located in 
the Baltic it most likely will continue to play an important role as the gatekeeper between 
NATO and Russia, whether it is through the High North, the Baltic, or both areas 
simultaneously. The continued security threat that Russia poses throughout Europe 
supports the importance of maintaining a strong Norway at an acceptable state of readiness. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The policies and documents that have been written about the defense strategies in 
the Baltic region have shown movement towards continued cooperation between 
Scandinavian states to help deter Russia. The increased cooperation is movement in a 
positive direction for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but discussion continues on each 
country maintaining its neutrality from any military alliances. In the past neutrality has 
played a role in dictating Sweden and Finland’s policies, but with the current tension that 
has risen from Russia’s actions, there may be changes on the horizon. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Sweden, Finland, and NATO are using visible language that indicates an increased 
security posture among western countries. Through further analysis, I hope to find how the 
neutrality that Finland and Sweden propose in their documents is perceived by other 
countries around them, specifically Russia, and to what extent that would refrain from 
conflict due to their language of cooperation with NATO and the United States. 
One hypothesis is that Finland and Sweden will maintain their neutral positions and 
not officially align with NATO.57 Sweden and Finland were both neutral countries during 
the Cold War, World War II, and other conflicts going back to the early 1800s. Both 
countries have engaged in different conflicts throughout history, but never to the point of 
becoming entangled in wars. The extent of their neutrality and cooperation with other states 
has allowed both countries to gain resources and advance politically and militarily without 
having to abide by the restrictions of being part of a large alliance. There are both risks and 
advantages to what Sweden and Finland are doing, where may result in them having to 
choose whether or not to join the bigger alliance. 
In the event of conflict escalation in the Baltic, several nations would be forced to 
get involved depending on how a future conflict develops. A conflict could be contained 
within the Baltic and only involve the Nordic countries, but with different agreements and 
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treaties in place, it would likely grow much larger in scale. Another possibility is that 
through further bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Sweden, Finland, and the United 
States, the United States is brought into the conflict.58 The involvement of multiple 
countries in an all-out war between Russia and NATO would not be a favorable outcome, 
as deterrence would have failed. 
A second hypothesis is that cooperation will increase among Finland, Sweden, and 
Russia as long as there are agreements that the two Nordic countries remain neutral. By 
Finland and Sweden continuing an open dialogue about joining NATO, both domestically 
and internationally, they may maintain some leverage when dealing with Russia. This 
Nordic leverage may incentivize Russia to try to negotiate with them instead of conducting 
low- to high-level operations against Sweden or Finland. Similar events of semi-
cooperation and neutrality took place during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and Finland 
had the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was most likely 
forced upon Finland to prevent it from joining NATO while also staying out of the USSR.59 
Although cooperation between Finland and Sweden with Russia may not be as favorable 
for NATO, it would be favorable to those Nordic countries in keeping their neutrality and 
sovereignty. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A single case study will compare today’s aspects of the policies being implemented 
in the Baltic with what transpired during the Cold War. With the return to great power 
competition, the most recent and comparable example would be the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The United States does not fit perfectly into the model necessary to resemble 
Sweden or Finland, but the organizational structures in NATO are as applicable today as 
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they were during the Cold War. Through examining the dynamic of Sweden and Finland 
during the Cold War, the policies they employ today can be better understood. Several 
different areas could be examined, but the Cold War era appears to give the closest relatable 
explanations as to why the policies are being implemented in the Baltic in the manner that 
they currently are.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is organized by five chapters, beginning with the introduction of the 
relevant issues of Finland, Sweden, NATO, and the circumstances involving them in the 
Baltic, with Russia, post-annexation of Crimea. 
The second chapter will address the current militarily non-aligned countries of 
Sweden and Finland. In this chapter, I examine Swedish and Finnish defense policies 
within the region and the cooperation that has been shared between both nations. 
In the third chapter, I examine the role that NATO plays with Norway and the 
United States. The reason for choosing Norway is that it is also a Nordic state with ties to 
Sweden and Finland, while also having responsibilities to NATO. The United States plays 
a role in cooperation through bilateral and trilateral agreements between these countries 
outside of NATO. An analysis of NATO’s, Norway’s, and the United States’ policy’s 
should help to give a better understanding of the dynamic that is taking place in the Baltic 
region.  
In the fourth chapter, I make a comparison to the events that took place during the 
Cold War by examining the Nordic Policies for security defense in the Baltic. Looking at 
these Cold War policies and comparing them to the policies of today produce a better 
understanding of the decisions made. This singular case study seems the most relevant to 
the events that are taking place in today’s era of great power competition as the Cold War 
is the best fit in recent history. 
In the fifth and final chapter, I conclude why and how the defense policies of the 
states involved in the Baltic have changed in the manner that they have. Whether non-
military alignment and neutrality played a factor in Nordic security policies regarding 
17 
Russia or if deepened cooperation efforts with surrounding western countries have played 
a role in deterring Russia. If these two factors have played a role then how much? Will the 
level of deterrence that worked during the Cold War be as effective in today’s world or is 
something more required now? 
Each chapter builds from the overlying issues of defense policy which is introduced 
in chapter one and gives an overview of the research. Chapter two looks at the region focus 
of Finland and Sweden, which is expanded in chapter three to a global multinational 
perspective with NATO. Chapter four provides continuity between polices during the 
beginning of the Cold War and the contemporary era. Finally, chapter five draw concludes 
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II. SWEDISH AND FINNISH DEFENSE POLICY SINCE THE 
ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
This chapter examines contemporary Sweden’s and Finland’s foreign and security 
policy towards Russia before and after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This event caused 
alarm and a shift towards a renewed forward defense against Russian aggression in 
northern Europe and heightened security cooperation in their association with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This chapter will also discuss each country’s 
security policies and defense strategies and how they have evolved since 2014, considering 
the continued war in the Donbas region.60 Although Sweden and Finland are not included 
under Article X and Article V of NATO but members of the Partnership for Peace, they 
both still maintain close cooperative efforts with NATO as well as with other European 
Union (EU) security and defense organizations. This post-2014 increase in cooperation 
between Sweden and Finland is important to discuss in this study. Both countries are 
furthering cooperation with the United States, NATO-allied countries, and NATO as a 
whole in a consequential manner. Have Sweden and Finland done enough to increase each 
countries defense capabilities to fend off an attack made by Russia? If a single country was 
attacked by the full force of the Russian military, it would most likely not be able to defend 
itself effectively. All the same, collective defense efforts have been developed and given 
the reemergence of new defense spending and technology, it would appear that chances of 
survival for Sweden and Finland have improved compared to pre-annexation of Crimean 
times.  
A. SWEDEN 
From the end of the wars in the early 1800s, Sweden has had a non-aligned military 
agreement primarily to prevent itself from becoming entwined with other countries’ affairs 
and potentially being dragged into another war. Sweden is centrally located in the Baltic 
between great powers in the East and West, which has made it challenging to remain 
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military non-aligned from organizations such as NATO, since its foundation in 1949. 
Sweden does cooperate through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in security building as well 
as in aspects of operations and especially in education and training with NATO.61 Sweden 
has additional bilateral agreements with the United States and its neighbor Finland in 
support of its defense and security in the Baltic.62 Although Sweden and Finland are 
currently independent sovereign countries, they have historical ties that go back hundreds 
of years. During the 17th century, when Sweden was a strong power its influence ran 
through the Baltic as the leading power and within the leading powers of Europe.63 During 
this period, Sweden included the Finnish population that now makes up the country of 
Finland. Sweden not only played a part in the Thirty Years War, but also played a role in 
several conflicts in Europe over the next hundred years, slowly losing more territory until 
Russian troops invaded Finland in 1808, leading to its separation from Sweden.64 Finland 
was not entirely dissolved into the Russian Empire and was allowed to rule itself internally, 
but was still controlled by the Russian Tsar.65  
Sweden successfully remained non-aligned/neutral through both World Wars and 
during the Cold War as marked in past historical events.66 Although Sweden remained 
outwardly neutral, it still worked with the West at varying capacities during the Cold War 
in the event the Soviet Union did decide to invade Swedish territory.67 After the fall of the 
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Soviet Union, there was a significant drop in Sweden’s military defense from the 1990s to 
mid-2010s, as its personnel strength went down from its wartime numbers of 800,000 down 
to 50,000.68 Russia was no longer seen as a threat to Sweden or any other country at this 
time as it was trying to recover from its collapse in the 1990s. One significant change that 
happened in 1999 was the election of the current President Vladimir Putin. President Putin 
has aimed to return Russia and its military to its former glory during the height of the Soviet 
Union and has pulled from historical figures of importance from Russia’s past.69 Although 
the early 2000s were not a reason for concern, the wars in Georgia (2008) and now Ukraine 
(2014) have given further reasons for alarm for the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea.70 
These wars with a Russian antagonist create a unique situation for Sweden as it is not a full 
member of NATO. As Russia has been able to conduct military operations and impose its 
will onto other countries without full kinetic force being used against it by other western 
nations, there is concern that Russia may turn west and try to gain further influence in the 
Baltic. 
Sweden has made significant efforts to support Western countries in the years 
leading up to the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine and has continued to support 
operations that provide for the security of Europe. Sweden is not the only country that has 
concerns about Russian interference in the Baltic, but all the other surround nations are 
members of NATO and would have the other members come to their aid under Article V 
if they were to be attacked by Russian aggression.71 Sweden has participated in several 
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NATO-led operations in support of European security. Such military operations included 
the 1995 NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo from 1999 to 2013, and 
in Afghanistan as part of the international security assistance force (ISAF) and the follow 
on resolute support mission (RSM).72 Sweden has been involved in these and many other 
international security missions that have been supported by the United Nations (UN). 
Sweden has also assisted with the United States’ mission in Iraq to resist the buildup of 
Islamic State fighters in the region.73  
Sweden has taken part in several military operations, but since the annexation of 
Crimea, it has begun increasing the number of military exercises it takes part in and 
organizes in the Baltic. Such exercises include the Swedish-organized AURORA 2017; 
BALTOPS, an annual exercise led by the United States; RAMSTEIN ALLOY, which 
incorporates Article V scenarios; and the Swedish-led exercise NORTHERN WIND 
2019.74 These Swedish-led exercises matter because they responded to Russian aggression 
against Ukraine in 2014. AURORA 17 tested the Swedish military’s ability to defend the 
country against an attack on the homeland with the support of surrounding NATO nations 
including the U.S. and Norway as well as its non-NATO neighbor Finland.75 
Although Sweden is separated from Russia by the Baltic Sea, military threats 
remain. These threats include the naval port of St. Petersburg, the Kaliningrad exclave, and 
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in the event of an invasion from the Kola peninsula to the North through Finland and 
Norway. There have been a variety of military threats from Russia during the Cold War 
that ranged from the strategic level of conflict down to the regional level of the Baltic, but 
due to further aggressive actions and challenging Swedish sovereignty, there is a growing 
reason for Sweden to ensure its security amongst its neighboring nations of the Baltic. Such 
incursions by Russian aircraft and naval vessels to enter Swedish airspace and territorial 
waters are a challenge to Swedish sovereignty.76 Russia has even gone to lengths to 
simulate nuclear strikes against Sweden as part of its military exercises and providing 
warnings to Sweden if it did chose to join NATO.77 Sweden is not alone in the number of 
aggressive actions taken against its country in the Baltic by the Russian military; aggressive 
actions have been performed against neighboring countries like Finland and NATO 
member nations such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.78 Due to 
these increased interactions with the Russian military that were similar to interactions with 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Sweden has had to readdress its defense strategy to 
posture against a resurgent Russia in the Baltic.  
At the end of the Cold War, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the balance of 
power shifted to the West, there was a time when wars and conflicts between major powers 
were no longer likely. The only security concerns to be expected were terrorist attacks and 
natural disasters. Due to this mindset, there were large cuts to Swedish military readiness 
as some 70 percent of military bases were closed and military spending percentage per 
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gross domestic product decreased over time.79 The decrease from wartime strength that 
had taken up much of the time and effort of the Swedish government seemed rational 
without a great power threat for it to be used against. With only minor conflicts in Europe 
and its surrounding periphery, a military that took on the form of a security force to take 
care of regional conflicts was likely all that was needed. However, the Swedish Ministry 
of Defense and members of the Swedish government have seen reasons why an increase in 
military capabilities is warranted to defend the country and provide support to its fellow 
Nordic countries in times of disaster or attack.80 
Sweden still plays a large role in contributing security and support as an “enhanced 
opportunities partner” after the 2014 Wales Summit that launched the Partnership 
Interoperability Initiative (PII) which is more or less a mechanism to square the circle of 
this non-Article V status.81 Sweden works closely with its neighbor Finland in supporting 
NATO as an enhanced opportunity partner in addition to bilateral agreements.82 In addition 
to Sweden’s role in partnership with NATO, Sweden is also a member of the EU for not 
only economic benefit and inclusion, but also for European security.83  
Although Sweden’s interests in joining the EU were more for economic reasons 
over security, the security of Europe still is important to Sweden because the security of its 
surrounding region has a direct impact on Swedish security. Although the EU is not 
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necessarily in the primary field of focusing on defense and security in the European region, 
it still plays a part in the supranational organization, especially when a majority of the 
members of the EU are also members of NATO. Sweden is in a unique position as being a 
member of the EU and not a member of NATO, but still has close ties with NATO. This 
puts Sweden in a unique position to further cooperation between NATO and the EU in the 
mutual defense of Europe through less redundant means of resources and information 
sharing. 
Sweden also takes part in Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) along with 
the other four Nordic countries—Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—to consolidate 
resources and continue to share information for the cooperative defense of the Nordic-
Baltic region.84 The agreement in 2009 was not the first time that the Nordic nations came 
together to deepen ties, but since the founding of the Nordic Council after World War II, 
each of these countries has provided support to one another.85 Cooperative efforts in the 
past have mainly focused on supporting UN-sanctioned missions. In more recent times with 
aggressive actions posed by Russia, defensive efforts have developed to provide security 
within and around the local region.86 Sweden has taken steps to deepen cooperative efforts 
with its fellow Nordic countries through additional sharing of information resources at both 
the political and military levels.  
Sweden has not only expanded its defense capabilities through internal advances in 
military technology and spending, but it has also branched out to cooperate with other 
countries to try to help maintain security in the Baltic. NATO, the EU, and NORDEFCO 
can help deter war as well as the lower-level, gray-zone conflicts that are currently much 
more visible. Additional bilateral agreements with countries like the United States are also 
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of significance since the transatlantic link and U.S. ties with Europe have been vital since 
the end of World War II.87 Sweden has made significant advances in its defense 
capabilities since the end of the Cold War and its post-peace decline in military spending 
and mobilization reductions. Sweden, along with other Western countries have woken up 
to the defense concerns that have arisen in the East. In order for them to be successful in 
keeping an effective deterrent and fighting force viable in the future continued cooperation 
and at all levels will be necessary. 
B. FINLAND 
Finland also has an important geopolitical position among the Nordic countries and 
the Baltic Sea Region. Finland shares the longest land border of 830 miles with Russia and 
has historically been squeezed between Sweden and Russia over the different military and 
political affairs throughout Finnish history.88 Finland, like Sweden, is a close partner with 
NATO but is not protected under Article V of collective defense.89 Finland is also a 
member of the EU and NORDEFCO with additional bilateral agreements with Sweden and 
the United States.90 Sweden actively participates in several different exercises and 
operations in cooperation with NATO and its surrounding neighbors in the Baltic.91 
Besides its increased cooperation with neighboring countries, Finland has taken steps at 
home to advance its defense capabilities to make it a harder target for Russian interference 
in its daily affairs and sovereignty. 
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Due to the historical impact that Russia has made on Finland by its incorporation 
into the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century and having to fight for Finnish 
independence from the Bolsheviks in 1918, there is an uneasiness about Russia’s foreign 
and military policies.92 Finland has responded to Russian aggression in Ukraine by 
addressing the Finnish defense policy to its sovereignty through its 2017 Government’s 
Defence Report.93 Finland has addressed several factors that could impact the security of 
its country including conflicts over multiple domains of warfare and the potential for 
conflict in the Baltic Sea to cut Finland off from other Western states.94 Finland 
understands that due to the large land border that is shared with Russia, a conflict could 
easily arise over a long front that would be difficult to control for a comparatively smaller 
force. Although there are continued efforts for cooperation with neighboring countries like 
Sweden and the Baltic states, Finland is still working to maintain and increase its military 
capabilities for if and when a military conflict could arise. 
Finland has noted areas to enhance its land defense to address the potential incidents 
that could take place along its long shared border with Russia. Finland has addressed these 
concerns by improving existing armored personnel carriers and purchasing Leopard 2A6 
tanks for use along its border.95 Additionally, the use of rapid reaction units (RRU) will be 
a focus for the Finnish Defence Forces to respond to any incidents along its border with 
Russia that could potentially escalate.96 The current wartime strength of Finland is 
approximately 230,000; additional forces from the Border Guard, which will fall under the 
Defence Forces in a time of crisis, will bring the total strength up to 280,000 troops.97 The 
Border Guard helps by ensuring the integrity of its external borders and defending those 
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borders if necessary.98 This number of troops is a strong defense force for the Finnish, but 
coming up against the full might of the Russian military that could likely deploy some 
300,000 troops in a wartime scenario and the additional amount of reserves available gives 
Russia the greater personnel force.99  
Since Russia has greater military forces to challenge Finland, the Finnish military 
will need a flexible joint response that includes its naval and air forces to provide support 
to land forces and potentially deny access to the Baltic Sea. Finland would use coastal and 
anti-ship missiles as well as sea mines to protect its sea lines of communication and 
maintain its control of the maritime realm through the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic 
Sea.100 Naval mine warfare is a definite option for the Finnish navy to implement in the 
defense of its country and to control the sea lanes to deny access to the Baltic for the fleet 
in St. Petersburg, Russia. Due to Finland’s geographic location, if it were to lose its control 
of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, it would be very challenging to receive economic 
and logistical support to continue its war efforts. 
However, in the event of a conflict with Russia, Finland will most likely not be 
alone due to its cooperative efforts with members of NATO, the EU, and its neighbor 
Sweden, with which it has deepened cooperative efforts. Finland takes part in the annual 
U.S.-led, NATO exercise of BALTOPS as well as having taken part in Article V scenarios 
during RAMSTEIN ALLOY.101 Sweden took part in 92 exercises and training events in 
2019 and is scheduled to take part in another 71 exercises in 2020.102 Not only has Finland 
taken part in several international exercises, but it has also shown itself capable of hosting 
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exercises to advance its cooperative efforts to further integrate with other nations as it did 
during exercise NORTHERN COASTS 2018.103 Finland’s cooperative efforts with 
NATO-aligned countries during Article V related exercises show that Finland is willing to 
get involved if a crises were to arise and by doing so believes that other countries would 
come to its aid as well.  
In addition to its partnership with NATO, Finland is a member of the EU and has 
shown greater interest in the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and permanent 
structured cooperation (PESCO) which are focused on deepened defense capabilities for 
the EU.104 Although the EU was initially more focused in economic and political 
cooperation it has evolved into debating matters of defense, even though many countries 
in Europe still primarily view NATO as the main provider of security for the region. The 
Lisbon Treaty, which was ratified by the European Council in 2007, gives the EU the 
ability to use the CSDP as a tool for the “prevention of conflicts and the preservation of 
international security.”105 Finland has also further engaged within PESCO to remain 
committed to fellow EU members that have taken part in advancing their collective defense 
through a variety of projects.106 Since Finland is a full member of the EU, it will likely 
look towards deepened cooperation with fellow EU members due to the commitment to 
come to one another’s aid in a time of disaster or crisis. 
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In addition to Finnish cooperation at the multinational level through supranational 
organizations, it has also signed bilateral agreements for defense cooperation. Such 
bilateral agreements include its closest neighbor in cooperation Sweden.107 These 
agreements are not necessarily legally binding defense treaties, as it is stated in the U.S. 
and Finnish statement of intent, but if a conflict were to arise, Finland would have allies 
for support. Although Sweden and the U.S. may be two of the stronger and largest bilateral 
cooperative supporters, Finnish defense still works to cooperate with other countries such 
as Belgium, Bulgaria, and Germany.108 Finland has also worked in bilateral capacities with 
other countries, “such as the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), France’s 
European Intervention Initiative (EII), and the German Framework Nation Concept 
(FNC).”109 Finland may work with its fellow nations in different capacities, but the closest 
partner of cooperation for defense security in the Baltic Sea Region would have to be 
Sweden. 
C. FINNISH AND SWEDISH DEFENSE COOPERATION 
Looking at Swedish and Finnish history and military non-alignment, the attraction 
between both countries to further defense cooperation becomes more understandable. Since 
both countries share a historical bond along with having a precarious history with Russia, 
combining forces makes for a better strategy when military non-alliance with NATO is the 
current outlook. Even before the annexation of Crimea, Sweden and Finland have worked 
closely together through different organizations like the EU, NATO, NORDEFCO, and the 
UN, but since 2014 onward both countries have worked to deepen cooperative efforts 
between military branches of service and through logistical support.110  
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Such cooperation has resulted in the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) 
which is working to find the best ways to combine its mission capabilities to be more 
effective and economically efficient in the Baltic.111 Since both countries are reliant on 
maritime industry and commerce through the region, the naval cooperative efforts are a 
strong point to focus on for the defense of the Baltics Sea. Having naval support and 
cooperation between Sweden and Finland could become vital for Finland in the chance that 
it loses its control of Finnish sea lanes in and out of the Baltic. If such an event were to 
happen then Finland could rely upon Sweden to help with its logistical support. Sweden 
has a major port in Gothenburg which is outside the Baltic Sea and has direct access to the 
North Sea through the Skagerrak.112 Even if Russia was to deny other countries access to 
the Baltic Sea through the use of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons station in the 
Kaliningrad exclave, there would still be a logistical path for posable support to Finland 
and/or the Baltic states if needed. Sea lines of communication (SLOC)s have always been 
and will remain an important part of maintaining control of the Baltic. In conjunction with 
the SFNTG, the sea surveillance cooperation Finland and Sweden provide the ability to 
share information between naval forces to have a more complete picture of the maritime 
area of operations.113 
Similar to the Finish and Swedish naval cooperation, the air forces of both countries 
have similar agreements to work towards a common command and control (C2), base 
operations, and air operations.114 For Army cooperation, the combination of a Finnish-
Swedish Brigade Framework is being worked on to better integrate capabilities that both 
countries can provide for different mission areas.115 To avoid the economic waste that 
comes with the initial development when Sweden and Finland innovate in separate 
                                                 
111 Villikori, “Finnish - Swedish Naval Co-Operation Baltic Rim Economies.” 
112 Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Christofer Berglund, “Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in 
the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications” (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish 
Defence Research Agency, n.d.), 63, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--
SE. 
113 Villikori, “Finnish - Swedish Naval Co-Operation Baltic Rim Economies.” 
114 “Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden,” 4-5. 
115 “Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden,” 5. 
32 
stovepipes, an increase in logistical cooperation between these countries will enable them 
to be more effective operationally, economically, and technically to provide better weapons 
systems.116 Sweden and Finland are also looking to have a secure communications 
capability that will allow both countries to share classified information as well as having 
secure video teleconference (VTC) capabilities and encrypted phone lines at the ministry 
and military levels.117 
The cooperative efforts that Finland and Sweden have displayed through 
memorandums, statements of intent, and the different operations and exercises that they 
take part in represent improvements from the declines of the early 2000s. Sweden has 
improved its capabilities and defense policies by executing exercises like AURORA 2017 
to test the abilities of its military and government to respond to an attack by an aggressor. 
Finland has addressed its needs to maintain the capabilities that it has and enhance the areas 
in each of the different domains of warfare that have fallen behind the current times. Each 
country by itself has made improvements upon its defense capabilities at the strategic level 
through policies and documents signaling its country’s changes. At the operational level, 
Sweden and Finland have joined together to become a more capable deterrent in the Baltic 
that has flexibility in the manner that it can respond to a potential threat.  
Cooperative efforts between Sweden and Finland have become stronger, but it will 
be a challenge to tell if these combined forces will be enough of a deterrent to its 
adversaries. Additional collaboration with other Nordic and Baltic countries through the 
institutions of NORDEFCO, the EU, and NATO will also be beneficial in enhancing 
Swedish-Finnish defense capabilities and signaling the position of each country and its 
cooperative efforts. Sweden and Finland both have interests in maintaining their security 
as well as providing support to its neighbors to help protect their security within the Baltic. 
Through the cooperation that these two countries have shown, a stable balance of power 
among traditionally militarily non-aligned states is possible in a resurgent world of great 
power competition. 
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III. NORWAY, THE UNITED STATES, AND NATO’S DEFENSE 
IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
This chapter analyzes Norway relative to its Scandinavian and Nordic neighbors 
within the Baltic Sea Region. The United States is examined in the role it has played among 
the surrounding countries in the Baltic. A final observation of the overall role that NATO 
has in the Baltic will be discussed as it relates to the Nordic countries and the states 
surrounding the Baltic Sea. Norway and the United States are members of NATO and 
cooperate with the countries of Sweden and Finland through multilateral channels of 
NATO in addition to multilateral cooperation between the Nordic countries and bilateral 
agreements of understanding with the United States.118 Through the observations at the 
regional, bilateral through hegemonic means, and supranational levels of organization, the 
role of the United States and NATO within the Baltic will become understood.  
A. NORWAY 
The Nordic countries have had interests in solving problems through multilateral 
means since the end of the Second World War.119 However, Norway and Denmark became 
members of NATO, while Sweden and Finland have tried to preserve positions of non-
alignment during the Cold War. Sweden and Finland have only warmed up to public 
cooperative efforts with NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union where western power 
in a unipolar world became the most probable option for the advancement of each respected 
country. Unlike Sweden and Finland, Norway chose to join NATO and was an original 
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signatory of the Washington Treaty in 1949.120 Norway was impacted by the Axis powers 
during WWII and likely saw a military alliance such as NATO beneficial to its survival 
during the Cold War so that Norway could be protected from the Soviet Union. The United 
States also stepped up as the predominant western power in Europe after WWII due to 
support through the Marshall Plan helping to rebuild Europe.  
A likely security reason for Norway joining NATO and closely aligning with the 
West was due to the development of U.S. nuclear weapons and the U.S. use of nuclear 
weapons to end the war with Japan. The U.S. was ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear 
development at the beginning of the Cold War and was the most likely ally to help preserve 
Norway’s sovereignty and security. Due to several advantages with western security and 
the fear that the Soviet Union could become the next Nazi Germany that would occupy 
Norway the Norwegians chose to align with NATO and western ideology. Norway’s 
neighbors, Sweden and Finland, could have also joined NATO but because Sweden and 
Finland had different experiences they did not. The resent event of WWII and how each 
country was treated during that war made an impact on the decision process of military 
alignments. Historical relationships from the 17th century up to WWI were also factors that 
drove the decision for Swedish and Finnish non-alignment with NATO due to past dealings 
with Russian military and foreign policy. These different experiences that each country had 
made a distinction on how each would determine its future security policies and 
alignments. 
Norway has taken part in a significant number of exercises and operations to show 
its support for western security. Although it has aligned with allies in NATO like the United 
States and others, it still cooperates closely with its Nordic neighbors through such 
organizations as NORDEFCO.121 Norway has cooperated closely with NATO since 
becoming a member in 1949 through different exercises and operations both military and 
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non-military. Much of the cold weather training that is conducted by NATO is typically 
held in Norway due to its landscape and geography.122 Norway’s Arctic climate allows 
NATO the ability to train for northern conflicts. As Norway was the only northern member 
of NATO that bordered the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it was an additional defense 
concern due to having the potential to be a conflict zone in addition to central Europe 
between East and West Germany. Norway has had deepened connections with NATO 
along with the United States and continued cooperation to improve security for both 
countries since the end of WWII. 
Norway is important for several strategic reasons to NATO and the U.S. to include 
maritime, land warfare, and nuclear operations that are coordinated with and through the 
country. Norway has had close ties with the United States through the Cold War and after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it has shown additional support through the Resolute 
Support Mission (RSM) by providing 54 troops to support the ongoing mission in 
Afghanistan.123 Although this is a coalition force that is involved in the Middle East, the 
participation by Norwegian military forces shows commitment to not only NATO but also 
the U.S. as a member country and partner in security cooperation. The U.S. and Norway 
have partnered in such ways that the U.S. sent 330 Marines to Norway to take part in winter 
training.124 There have been increases in military exercises and requests for more troops 
to be trained and capacities to be increased for U.S. capabilities in Norway, especially since 
the annexation of Crimea in 2014.125 Norway’s role as a northern European NATO country 
is important to the strategic defense of not only the alliance but also to the U.S. with regards 
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to sea power and nuclear striking capabilities.126 Due to the location of Norway it is the 
first line of defense to Russia in the Arctic Region for maritime and nuclear forces that 
could directly strike the Baltic. Norway’s location outside the Baltic would be a strong base 
of operations in the case that NATO had to fight its way back into the Baltic, due to the 
strong maritime culture of the country. Norway would likely be the first to detect Russian 
fleet movements in the Arctic that could have a direct impact on the Baltic and NATO 
operations. 
Norway, along with Sweden and Denmark surrounds the entrance to the Baltic Sea 
through the Danish straits. These straits are a significant maritime chock point for northern 
Europe for economic, political, and military purposes to connect with the rest of the world. 
Norway spans from the entrance of the Danish straits up to the Arctic and borders Russia, 
making Norway central to NATO and the U.S. in defense of its allies. Norway is a part of 
the first line of defense to contain Russian maritime forces from entering into the Atlantic 
Ocean from the Arctic and the Baltic Sea Region to prevent a disruption in NATO’s 
SLOCs.  
Another strategic concern for NATO and allied forces is the nuclear submarines 
based out of the Kola peninsula, giving Russia a secure second-strike capability in the event 
of a nuclear exchange between nations.127 Although the Russian nuclear submarines are 
outside the Baltic Sea, they can still impact the defensive security decision making for the 
states surrounding the Baltic Sea, most of which are members of NATO. Due to the 
potential nuclear conflict that could arise and the lack of any nuclear-capable states located 
in the Baltic, it is understandable why these states would want to be covered by the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella. Although Norway plays some role in cooperating with the U.S. and 
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NATO in supporting the deterrence efforts regarding nuclear forces, it still focuses on 
conventional means of deterrence since Norway is a non-nuclear state.  
Norway provides cooperative support to the members of NATO through land and 
naval forces, but it is also a member of NORDEFCO and has cooperated with the Nordic 
states via military and non-military capacities since the end of WWII and the beginning of 
the Cold War.128 Norway in cooperation with the Nordic states has worked militarily and 
politically in different capacities from the Nordic council after WWII and through other 
organizations through the years of the Cold War and post-Cold War era that have taken 
part in multilateral efforts.129 Some of the efforts that the Nordic states have taken part in 
have been supporting UN-sanctioned missions such as during the crisis in the Suez (1956), 
the Balkans, and a combined Nordic and Polish unit as part of the Implementation Force 
(IFOR).130 More recent events of cooperation during NORDSUP 2008 addressed areas 
that may require cooperative efforts for defense and helped with the creation of 
NORDEFCO.131 NORDEFCO was created the following year in 2009 from the 
collaborative efforts of previous organizations which brought the collective defense 
measures under one organization.132 
Although Norway is a member of NATO, it still has geographic and historical ties 
to its Scandinavian and Nordic neighbors for defense and security. Even before the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, Norway continued to collaborate with Sweden and Finland 
to help maintain security in the region. The concern for Russian interference in the 
sovereignty of the Nordic countries in the 1990s and early 2000s was not likely as the 
Russian state was working to stabilize itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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The major focus for Norway and its neighbors seems to have been on regional 
conflicts and a focus of anti-terrorism due to growing conflict in the Middle East that has 
spread to the lower parts of Europe. Due to the unlikely return to Cold War conditions 
during the Yeltsin and early Putin years, defense cooperation between the Nordic states 
should not have been seen as a threat, meaning no counterbalance would have been 
necessary. However, after the Georgian war in 2008 and the impact of the global recession, 
some European states saw potential security concerns and began work towards preserving 
security within the Baltic.133 Norway has been a member of NATO since its formation and 
will most likely continue in its capacities to deepen military ties with the West to maintain 
its security, but will also advance its relations with Sweden and Finland to maintain security 
in the Baltic while Norway continues to strengthen defenses in the North. 
B. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The United States has had interests in European affairs since the early years, despite 
trying to remain out of the destructive wars that took place on the European continent. It 
was not until the U.S. became a strong enough power and began to develop interests 
overseas that it began reaching out and eventually entered into two World Wars that 
involved military actions in Europe. By the end of WWII, the U.S. was a superpower in 
competition with the Soviet Union and the Cold War ensued until the collapse of the USSR 
in the early 1990s. After the Cold War, the U.S. was the unchallenged hegemonic power 
of a unipolar world until a resurgent Russia and a rising China developed after the turn of 
the century.  
The U.S. has remained engaged in European affairs and defense security through 
organizations such as NATO, which it was a founding member of in 1949, as well as 
                                                 
133 Cohen, “The Russo-Georgian War’s Lesson.” 
39 
through bilateral agreements with other countries such as Sweden and Finland.134 The U.S. 
has shown its support in the Baltic through several military exercises such as the annual 
BALTOPS that is led by U.S. maritime forces and takes part in other exercises throughout 
the Baltic.135 The U.S. has also taken part in exercises led by NATO partners Sweden and 
Finland during AURORA 2017 and Northern Coasts 2018, respectively.136 The U.S. is 
also a member of NATO’s enhanced forward presence in charge of the Battlegroup station 
in Poland with 857 of its troops.137 The U.S. has taken steps to cooperate within the Baltic 
in bilateral and multilateral manners that are consistent with maintaining security among 
the northern European countries.  
The United States has had to reassure its allies in Europe that it will continue to be 
a contributing member of NATO will enact Article V for the collective defense of the other 
member countries.138 The U.S. has been the major military power in the alliance since its 
foundation with conventional and nuclear forces. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has been 
paramount to the deterrent capability of the alliance against the Soviet Union and with 
Russia after the end of the Cold War.139 Helping to prevent conflicts from escalating to a 
nuclear level the collective forces of NATO can focus on the conventional and non-linear 
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levels of warfare without having to overcompensate for a nuclear attack from Russia. The 
advantage for cooperative security between the U.S. and members of NATO can be 
beneficial to each country as long as freeriding is kept to a minimum and strategically 
important countries come to a consensus with one another on the defense of the 
organization. 
The United States is still engaged in fighting terrorism as it has done since the 
beginning of the 21st century, but it has been in the process of shifting towards the return 
to great power competition in a similar manner to which the Cold War was conducted. 
With the U.S. considering allies in the Eastern hemisphere that have to contend with China 
there is potential for the U.S. to overextend and become weaker in its commitments to 
NATO and other European allies, which may continue to be tested by the Russian 
government. The U.S. has official agreements with members of NATO, but the 
memorandums of understanding and the statements of intent with Sweden and Finland due 
not provide a collective defense aspect that the U.S. would come to the aid of either country 
if it was attacked by an aggressor. Although, through the deepened efforts to further 
cooperation between the U.S., Swedish, and Finnish defense departments and ministries in 
the event of an attack on either Nordic country a strong response from the U.S. government 
seems likely. A response to an attack would be even more likely if U.S. military members 
were involved in some manner similar to the “enhanced forward presence” of troops 
located in the Baltic states and Poland.140 The U.S. has several options to choose from in 
the diplomatic, military, and other areas of global influence that can impact the cooperative 
efforts among the Nordic states and could be interpreted as a deepened security strategy 
for the Baltic by neighboring countries. The U.S. in cooperation with its allies and partners 
with NATO will have to use good judgment on how that message is interpreted by 
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surrounding European countries to prevent or dampen expansionist influences in the Baltic 
Sea Region.141 
The United States has had varying levels of cooperation and engagement with 
Sweden and Finland during World War II, the Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. These 
changing degrees of cooperation have evolved from less intrusive and at some points 
secretive defense discussions into a more open and public dialogue that can be observed 
and assessed by neighboring nations. Allowing other countries to see the U.S. strategy can 
be beneficial in deterring aggressive acts by showing that the U.S. and its allies have 
primacy in the region and that it is not worth the risk of upsetting the balance in place. 
However, cultural values must be considered for the different parts of the region of Europe, 
and understanding how the culture and the values of a country are part of the calculus of 
security decision making is important in making such decisions for the U.S. With these 
thoughts in mind and considering U.S. relationships with its European allies defense 
strategies in the region have become more open between the U.S. and NATO partners, 
Sweden, and Finland. 
C. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
NATO was initially founded in 1949 to balance against the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact at the start of the Cold War.142 With the end of the Cold War in the early 
1990s, NATO focused on regional conflicts such as in Kosovo and later in the Middle East 
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.143 NATO has made 
another shift to refocus on a resurgent Russia and a return to competition similar to the 
Cold War but in the 21st century. NATO has addressed the actions taken by Russia in the 
2014 annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine by conducting the 2014 
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Wales Summit denouncing the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty.144 NATO has taken 
additional steps to protect its allies through enhanced forward presence (eFP) in the Baltic 
states and Poland after discussion at the Warsaw Summit in 2016.145 NATO is adaptable 
to different challenges that it may be forced to face and continues to adapt through 
multinational cooperation as seen through the battlegroups that have been deployed and 
the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as part of the NATO Response Force 
(NRF) that is standing by for deployment in a time of crisis.146 NATO has several member 
countries that surround the Baltic Sea that take part in a few cooperative efforts—eFP, 
VJTF, and NRF—and each of these countries have varying capabilities that can be offered 
up for the collective defense of NATO.  
Much of life in the Nordic, Baltic, and northern European countries transpires along 
the coastlines of each country making the Baltic Sea important to the geopolitical and 
economic wellbeing of NATO members. Although the maritime realm in the Baltic is 
mostly free, it can potentially be turned into an environment that has capabilities denied by 
advisories working in the region. One such threat to NATO members and partners is the 
Kaliningrad exclave on the border of the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania.147 
There have been concerns that the corridor between Poland and the Baltic states could be 
closed in the event of a push by Russian forces through Belarus connecting Kaliningrad 
with the main body of Russia.  
The potential threat of A2/AD weapons in the exclave are a concern to neighboring 
countries surrounding the Baltic Sea as these weapons could place military forces in a 
denied environment making operations more challenging and raising the potential risk. 
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There are a variety of weapons such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system (SAM), 
coastal missile defenses like the Bastion-P that uses anti-ship cruise missiles, and Iskander-
M ballistic missiles.148 These weapons systems in conjunction with the manipulation of 
the electromagnetic spectrum could make a conflict in the Baltic Sea for NATO maritime 
forces a challenge. Cyber-warfare and disinformation used at levels viewed below the 
kinetic threshold of warfare can be as great a problem as the kinetic weapons that are 
stationed in Kaliningrad. The use of television like RTV in the Baltic states and the use of 
bots and trolls to influence political decision making such as in Swedish elections are some 
cases where Russia has tried to interfere with the sovereignty of countries by manipulation 
at lower levels of conflict.149 It is not only at the operational level of warfare that NATO 
and its allies should consider when conflict arises in regional affairs, but up to the strategic 
level with all potential options of conflict that should be considered when engaged with 
Russia.  
The different members of NATO have a variety of capabilities that can be offered 
to assist in the Baltic, but many of the nations that surround the Baltic are more focused on 
the potential of a land conflict over that of maritime conflict. Much of the wars of Europe 
have been fought and decided on land with some major naval battles through history but 
the decisive points of victory were determined on land. The importance of maintaining 
open sea lanes is for the flow of needed resources and personnel associated with the defense 
and security of the Baltic and of Europe such as during both world wars. NATO has been 
working to increase its maritime capabilities not only in the Baltic but in other bodies of 
water where conflict with the Russian Navy or other forces could arise like the Black Sea 
or the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. 
The NATO maritime forces are broken up into four groups to allow for flexibility 
in response to potential maritime threats or crises. Two of these groups contain frigates and 
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destroyers that are a part of the standing NATO maritime groups one and two (SNMG) and 
the other two groups contain mine countermeasure units part of standing NATO mine 
countermeasure groups one and two (SNMCMG).150 These maritime forces are comprised 
of a variety of vessels from countries like Norway, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to 
name a few and each group is commanded by a different officer from that member 
countries naval force.151 These four groups make up the core naval force for NATO as part 
of the VJTF under the NRF, but additional naval forces can be called up if needed in the 
event of a crisis.152 
While not all of these forces are located in the Baltic there are countries like 
Denmark and Germany that have strong naval capabilities that can support other countries 
in the Baltic. Some countries like the Baltics states are more inclined to mine and 
countermine warfare and do not have the capabilities for anti-air warfare or anti-submarine 
warfare. Although this may appear as a disadvantage for individual countries it can be seen 
as an advantage for the collective defense of NATO. While the Baltic states handle mine 
warfare the other naval forces of NATO are free to push resources into the development 
and training of advancing surface, air, or subsurface capabilities in the warfare environment 
of the Baltic. Navies have always required a large checkbook to maintain and to stay 
relevant in an evolving world of warfare. By sharing the cost and the capabilities over a 
collective group the members of NATO can have a diverse amount of capabilities with 
specializations and expertise in each country for a cost that is manageable for each 
member’s economy.153 
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Norway, the United States, and NATO each have specific interests and concerns 
when dealing with potential security and defense issues in the Baltic region. Although 
Norway and the United States are not bordering the Baltic Sea, they both have interests 
with the organizations and countries that are located within the region. The historical and 
cultural ties of Scandinavia make defense cooperation a reasonable objective among 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. The shared border that Norway has with Russia and 
Finland ties in for cooperative efforts farther north that impacts the state of affairs in the 
Baltic. The United States has interests with the countries of the Baltic and continues to 
build on its cooperation with Sweden and Finland. Even though Sweden and Finland are 
not members, NATO remains close as each country is considered part of the Western 
European ideals and values.  
Although each country and the collective organization of NATO as a whole may 
have different values associated with the security and defense of the Baltic, there is still the 
overall importance of the security of the collective countries that fall under the western 
allies. Some countries may feel more threatened than others by aggressive actions posed 
against them by the Russian military. However, in the cooperative security agreements 
between nations, there is the strategic ability to make a strong enough force to counter 
aggressive actions made against member countries and partners depending on the level of 
integration and shared capabilities between those forces. NATO and other member 
countries appear to be working towards these cooperative security goals at the diplomatic, 
information sharing, military, and economic levels. If NATO is to be successful at 
deterrence to ensure the security of the Baltic then it must continue to move in this direction 
to have a formidable force ready if that deterrence fails. 
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IV. A CASE STUDY OF DEFENSE POLICIES IN SCANDINAVIA 
DURING THE COLD WAR 
This chapter examines the circumstances of Swedish and Finnish defense policies 
during the Cold War and how they compare to the defense policies that are in place in 
response to increased instances of Russian aggression since 2014. The relationships among 
Norway, the United States, and NATO with Sweden and Finland are examined for how 
neutrality and semi-cooperative efforts were enacted during the Cold War. The 
relationships among these different countries during the Cold War compared to present 
times after the annexation of Crimea will show the changes that have taken place in defense 
policies in the Baltic. Finland and Sweden are caught between two great powers in the East 
and the West and each country’s defense policy decisions will have implications upon how 
that state is treated by either side. Even though after the Cold War hostilities did not appear 
likely to resume, the cooperative efforts that Sweden and Finland have shown with NATO 
and the West may have a bigger impact on each country’s defense situation in the Baltic. 
In a new era of great power competition, there are pressures to join military alliances that 
can become challenging when caught between rivals that will test a country’s neutrality in 
war and non-alignment in peace. 
One such country that has faced challenges to its sovereignty is Sweden. In recent 
years, Sweden has been more closely aligned to western policies, but that has not always 
been the case. The interactions between the West and Sweden developed over time from 
neutral to semi-cooperative efforts during the Cold War. At the end of World War II 
Sweden initially tried to establish a Scandinavian defense union (SDU) but was ultimately 
unsuccessful in 1949 as Norway and Denmark joined NATO.154 Sweden has not officially 
aligned militarily with another country since the end of the Napoleonic wars, although 
Sweden did assist its neighbor Finland during the Russo-Finnish Winter War but not under 
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official Swedish capacities.155 Since Sweden was unable to make a Nordic defense alliance 
at the end of WWII it was in a position to become militarily non-aligned so as not to get 
mixed up in a conflict between the USSR and NATO.156 If an attack was made against 
Sweden there was thought that aid would come from its neighboring countries to support 
Sweden in a time of crisis.  
Initial relations between the United States and Sweden were non-existent, taking 
the time and the right people to open lines of communication and cooperation between the 
two countries.157 There was likely still mistrust after the war as Sweden had provided iron 
ore to Germany through the duration of WWII, even though it likely had no other 
choice.158 Although relations may not have quickly evolved and further developed soon 
after the war, by the 1950s and 1960s increased capacities for intelligence sharing on Soviet 
military assets that were spread throughout the Baltic were being passed along to the United 
States.159 Even though Sweden was not directly aligned with the United States it still 
cooperated at certain levels to help protect the security of Sweden. 
Sweden’s official foreign policy was neutrality during the Cold War with plans to 
remain neutral if war broke out between other nations.160 The political boundaries had 
changed since the end of WWII with much of Eastern Europe in control of the Soviet Union 
and the Baltic States under control of the USSR. Due to the shrunken distance between 
Sweden to Russia, with Finland in between with minimal strategic depth, remaining 
impartial to either the West or the East seemed to be in the best interest of the survival of 
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Sweden. Sweden could have potentially become the next battleground for WWIII along 
with East and West Germany if Sweden had decided to officially commit to an alignment 
with the West. To maintain the Swedish outward appearance of neutrality it had to 
cooperate with Western countries, like the United States, in secret for military purposes.161 
The Social Democratic government of Sweden helped prevent Soviet suspension from 
rising with its pro-Soviet tendencies that made the country and its people seem to be more 
left-leaning even while cooperating with Western nations.162 It would appear that Sweden 
had two separate dialogues between the East and the West that tried to show neutrality, but 
was in actuality secretive cooperation. 
Sweden was important to the United States and NATO during the Cold War for 
several different reasons and Sweden cooperated with the West in a variety of ways from 
intelligence sharing to increase the capacities of Swedish landing strips for American heavy 
bombers.163 Another important part of Swedish cooperation is that Swedish airspace 
provided a direct route for U.S. and NATO bombers to strike priority targets located in the 
Soviet Union.164 Although Sweden agreed to some cooperative efforts with NATO to 
assist in some logistical capacities it did not fully know the entire plan for a NATO nuclear 
strike against the Soviet Union since it was not a member. Since Sweden had agreed to 
cooperate in some areas NATO expected Sweden to allow its aircraft and likely other 
requirements to fly through Sweden without concern and just allow it to happen.165  
The likely reasoning behind Swedish cooperation with the West is due to the 
isolation the country was put in after its Scandinavian neighbors, Norway and Denmark 
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joined NATO instead of forming a neutral SDU which could have protected themselves 
from a Soviet attack. The occupation of Norway and Denmark during the Second World 
War is a primary reason why these two countries were much more eager to join a defense 
alliance like NATO over a neutral weaker alliance like the SDU. Sweden had been able to 
maintain somewhat of a neutral stance during the war while allowing some slight 
concessions to Germany and the allies at different times of the war when it was in Sweden’s 
best interest for self-preservation. If the roles had been reversed and Sweden had been 
occupied by Nazi Germany, violating its neutrality in the war, then Sweden would have 
likely joined NATO instead of trying to remain neutral. However, these were not the 
historical events that took place so Sweden is still a close partner with NATO, but has not 
become a member like Norway and Denmark.  
Even with the failure of the SDU, Sweden still maintained close relations for 
cooperative efforts with its Norwegian neighbor during the Cold War. Key connections 
that were made between Sweden and Norway for intelligence sharing during the Cold War 
were made back during WWII when Norwegian refugees fled occupied Norway to take 
refuge in Sweden.166 Denmark joined a few years later in the intelligence-sharing with 
Sweden and Norway after an informal meeting in Gothenburg in 1948 between each of the 
represented countries.167 Since these three countries were working towards further 
cooperation in intelligence sharing the Swedish intelligence office that coordinated with 
Norway and Denmark was only one part of the two departments that collected intelligence 
for the Swedish government.168 The cooperative efforts between Sweden and Norway 
during the beginning of the Cold War were close and if or when the Soviet Union invaded 
Scandinavia there were expectations that the two countries would combine forces in 
defense of one another.169 Much of what was discussed among the Scandinavian countries 
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was kept secret and away from public viewing to protect the Swedish position of neutrality 
and keep the country from becoming entangled in any future conflicts.  
Compared to the events of the Cold War it seems that Sweden has taken a more 
public stance on the defense of its country after the annexation of Crimea as compared to 
its cooperative efforts in secrecy during the Cold War. A likely reason for the change in 
defensive strategy is that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Sweden became increasingly 
closer to the West as it no longer had to fear military incursions into its country by Russia. 
Since the United States was the remaining hegemon it was in Sweden’s best interests to 
more closely align towards western ideals and values to better its own country 
economically. Once Russia came back and rose as a resurgent power there was no going 
back to the secret cooperative efforts that Sweden once had done during the Cold War 
because Russia was already aware of Swedish cooperation with the West. Sweden 
understands that it cannot go back to the old ways of conducting its defense cooperation 
through secretive means, but must still maintain its position of neutrality and non-
alignment by not becoming a member of NATO. Even though Sweden is not a full member 
of NATO, Sweden will still cooperate closely with NATO to make it a hard target for 
Russia and preserve Swedish sovereignty. 
Although Finland has grown close in cooperation with Sweden through bilateral 
and multilateral organizations, Finland has always had a strong Russian neighbor looming 
over each of its moves. Finland’s history between Russia and Sweden has made for 
interesting defense considerations. For most of Finnish history, it was part of Sweden until 
it was seceded to Russia in 1809 and did not gain its independence until the Bolsheviks 
revolution in Russia.170 The Soviet Union tried to regain its control, but only gained 
moderate territories through the Winter War of 1939–1940.171 Finland did briefly join Nazi 
Germany to fight the Soviets but never regained lost territories from previous conflicts.172 
Finland has tried to remain neutral in all of its dealings, but its record of going against 
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Russian actions is still echoed throughout history and Russia seems to expect the same 
stance of defense again from Finland. 
The Finnish-Soviet security treaty of 1948, also known as the Treaty on Friendship, 
Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, put Finland in a sort of hold by the Soviet Union as 
Finland promised it would not attack the USSR as long as it was not attacked.173 There 
were also understandings within this treaty that if Finland did feel threatened that a neutral 
country such as itself could look for aid from anyone willing to assist, which at the time 
would likely have had to be the Soviet Union.174 Finland likely felt cut off in a defense 
policy aspect from the west due to its previous alliances and failures of support against the 
Soviet Union during the Winter War and after supporting the Axis powers during WWII 
for a short time it was an additional challenge to be accepted by western standards.  
Although Finland proclaimed neutrality to protect itself from getting in between a 
war among NATO and the Warsaw Pact it was economically aligned to the West with its 
free-market economy.175 Since Finland was divided economically and militarily it would 
be viewed as being split between the great power competition of the Cold War and had to 
drive policies in the best manner that its government could to remain neutral. If neutrality 
had broken down and conflict had ensued between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Finns 
would have likely been fighting alone just as they had during the Winter War a few years 
earlier.176 It was important for Finland to maintain its neutrality during the Cold War due 
to past decisions and interactions of alliances. If Finland had made any rapid decisions to 
join alliances like NATO it would have set off alarms within the Soviet Union. It was also 
likely improbable that NATO could allow Finland to align militarily with the West so soon 
after the end of WWII due to previous alliances, but after the first 20 years of the Cold War 
would have been more likely to consider a closer partnership. 
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Finish and Swedish defense policies during the Cold War have some similarities to 
the defense policies of the current timeframe after the annexation of Crimea. Both countries 
have refrained from becoming full members of NATO, but each has increased cooperative 
capacities and capabilities with the organization since the fall of the Soviet Union. Both 
Sweden and Finland have joined the EU not only for increased economic potential but also 
for the security of Europe as a collective.177 The neutrality that both countries once 
announced during the Cold War as the official stance of each country has evolved into a 
non-alignment with NATO, but there has been enhanced cooperation that could eventually 
lead to membership if the right conditions are met. Sweden and Finland, although different 
in each of its approaches to foreign policy and defense, have strengthened cooperative 
efforts between one another and the rest of Europe to better the security and stability of the 
Baltic Sea Region. 
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Sweden and Finland have had a long history with one another and the surrounding 
states that precedes the contemporary issue of security policies in the Baltic. Although a 
great deal has changed in the world since the 17th century and the conflict of the Thirty 
Years War, some things resonate through time and reappear as a different political, social, 
and military function. What can be determined through observations of past events and 
alliances is that non-alignment and neutrality can be used for strategic planning to remain 
out of large military alliances under the correct conditions. Varying levels of neutrality 
during times of war and non-alignment during times of peace have allowed Sweden and 
Finland to remain out of fully joining NATO while still cooperating at increasing levels to 
gain much of the benefits. Due to specific shifts in the control of power in the world going 
form bipolar during the Cold War to a unipolar world post-Cold War and now with a return 
of great power competition there is more visibility of cooperation for Baltic security and 
defense. Due to the historical events of the past and the experiences that each country 
endured during war and peace led decisions to cooperate with other countries in certain 
manners and to implement to security policies that are currently in place in the Baltic. 
Neutrality has been used by countries like Switzerland and the U.S. throughout 
history to prevent belligerent powers from intervening in the affairs of the state or when a 
state would only suffer great losses from involving itself in the foreign affairs and wars of 
Europe. Neutrality has helped the U.S., when it was a weaker state during the 19th century, 
to mostly remain out of the great wars of Europe until it was thrust into becoming a great 
power at the turn of the century. Sweden was at its height of power during the 17th century 
over much of Europe, but due to loss of territory and other states gaining greater power 
over Sweden, it finally had to protract into policies of neutrality for the preservation of its 
sovereignty. Finland, which has traded hands between Sweden and Russia, has also had to 
pursue a policy of neutrality when it was not strong enough to take on outside forces but 
when threatened, such as defending against the Bolshevik revolution and during the Winter 
War with the Soviet Union, it used what force it could muster to fend off its aggressor. 
Although the Finnish may have tried to remain neutral and join an alliance it still looked 
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for help from western countries that shared similar values for help during times of conflict 
and times of peace. 
It can be much easier for a country to align with other countries of similar values 
once attacked by a country on the other end of the polarized spectrum. A bipolar world can 
make decision making seem simpler because a country has only one of two choices to pick 
between which side it should fall under. The Cold War made decision making for the East 
and the West understandable as the East forced control over soviet states through terror 
and the West gave decisions for free liberal democracy to spread. Sweden and Finland 
found themselves between these two superpowers during the Cold War and had unique 
ways of maintaining their sovereignty while not officially aligned with the East or the West 
in the public domain of influence. Sweden did have regular communication and 
cooperation efforts with the U.S. since it had stronger western values over ideologies of 
the East. Finland has similar western values, but because of past incursion with Russia and 
the Soviet Union, it had to pursue a form of détente. By Finland having a level of 
understanding with the Soviet Union, it could live in peace between the East and the West 
without being swallowed up by the Soviets as the Baltic States had been. Both Sweden and 
Finland used varying amounts of neutrality and non-alignment, to work for its benefit to 
remain out of conflict the best it could while trying to retain its strength so it did not become 
a weakened European power after engagement in war. These policies of neutrality come 
from the lessons learned during the decline from power centuries ago which still have an 
impact on decision making today. 
One main difference between Swedish and Finnish defense policy during the Cold 
War as compared to today is the presentation in the public sphere so that all nations can 
see Swedish and Finnish cooperative efforts with the West. During the Cold War much of 
what was done between non-aligned Nordic countries was kept secretive. However, since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the closed doors have opened up into showing the cooperative 
security strategy Sweden and Finland have been leaning towards. The countries 
surrounding the Baltic at the end of the Cold War likely never expected Russia to become 
as great of a threat again, as seen from a western perspective, and felt it would be prudent 
to try and more closely align to the West for economic and security advancement. After 
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the end of the Cold War, there were no expectations for larger-scale conflicts to arise once 
more as they did during the World Wars, but instead only small regional conflicts involving 
non-state actors or terrorist groups that could be dealt with smaller security forces. The 
rapid drawdown by most countries' military forces lulled many into a false state of security 
until Russian forces invaded Ukraine. Once NATO began waking up to the potential threat 
that Russia was once again becoming, NATO has made modest attempts to build up its 
strength to be a deterrent to Russia and have a substantial enough force to defend against 
Russian aggression in the evolving domains of warfare. 
Deterrence during the Cold War is not the same deterrence in the contemporary era. 
There are similarities when looking at power and influence, but it is not a conflict of 
democracy against communism as it was described during the Cold War. There is still a 
difference of values between the U.S. and Russia, and the East and the West, and how those 
values play into economic strength, social and cultural norms, and how people view 
themselves within each of these two systems. These differences between the two nations 
have caused growing tension and friction between them which caused a divide in Europe 
during the Cold War and is shifting back now with additional countries opposing Russian 
foreign policies and incursions into other sovereign nations. Violations of international law 
in a system that is not bought into by Russia will only fluster both sides since neither one 
will understand the other's logic if they can not see past their own. Until the civil-military-
political systems can meet at more common ground, interactions between East and West 
will continue to be a challenge with one another at varying levels of intensified aggression 
and hostilities.  
Russia has taken to commencing hostile acts on its boards where potential 
insecurity could arise or potential gains to strengthen its security could be made. The Baltic, 
being one such area, has been and will continue to be a region where Russia has security 
interests just the same as the other states that surround the Baltic Sea have security 
concerns. The historical, geopolitical, and values of the Baltic play a role in the security 
policies chosen by the states in the region. The experiences through history from the 
transition of Swedish power to a neutrality policy that has become a cooperative 
engagement strategy is linked to its experiences during WWII and the Cold War. Sweden 
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looks for deepened cooperation with fellow Nordic countries to make a strong enough 
deterrent in Northern Europe while being selective with its cooperation with NATO. By 
staying under NATOs shadow while still seeking defense cooperation through 
NORDEFCO and the EU it has effectively made a layered defense around itself without 
joining the antagonist to Russian security policy, NATO. Finland in a similar manner has 
done what Sweden has aimed for as a security policy that incorporates layered defenses 
through partnerships, but Finland is on the front line with its shared border with Russia. 
The geopolitical aspect for Finland would seem that it would have joined NATO like the 
Baltic States did before Russia became a resurgent power, but it did not. Instead, Finland 
has been able to stay between East and West with depend cooperation with NATO while 
not upsetting the balance with Russia. While the other surrounding Nordic, Baltic, 
Scandinavian, and Northern European countries are members of NATO and have set 
articles that define each of their defense requirements and necessary security policies in the 
region, Sweden and Finland have flexibility in their response to Baltic security. 
The reason that understanding Baltic security is important to a naval officer that 
may serve in this region is that understanding the dynamics between countries and between 
alliances makes a difference in that naval officer's effectiveness. The capabilities that each 
country can offer in the defense of the Baltic vary and each state has to consider its 
domestic policies as they affect the foreign policy and interactions with neighbor states. A 
naval officer who has a better understanding of the internal workings of countries that 
surround the Baltic will be more effective at the joint staff level. Focusing purely on the 
military aspect of cooperation can achieve a minimal effect, but by cooperating with Baltic 
partners at the diplomatic, information, and economic levels a stronger strategy can be 
accomplished. 
The importance of maritime forces is central to the Baltic since all the countries in 
the region rely on the Baltic Sea for commerce and military defense. Many nations that are 
impacted by this region have a strong focus on maritime power such as Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, and Norway. The other countries of mainland Europe are more concerned with 
land defense and potential choke points like the Suwalki Gap or the Fulda Gap. There is 
also the choke point at sea, the Danish Straits, that if shut down could cut off the countries 
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in the Baltic by maritime means of defense. Understanding these strategic points in the 
region and the significance to each country that presides over them gives a clearer 
understanding of decisions among Baltic nations. Through gaining a better understanding 
of how cooperation and interactions between nations work in the Baltic, a naval officer will 
be a more effective strategic planner.  
 Potential areas for further research should include the high north or Arctic 
region since this area directly impacts Norway and other Nordic countries. Russia's secure 
second-strike capability, nuclear submarines, also operate in this area and have a direct 
strategic impact on decision making in the Baltic. The North Atlantic and the Norwegian 
Sea could also be areas of future interest as submarine capabilities and usage increase. The 
Baltic and northern Europe are an ever-growing area of interest for political, economic, 
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